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This paper proposes a simple Ordered Probit model to analyse the monetary policy reaction 
function of the Colombian Central Bank. There is evidence that the reaction function is 
asymmetric, in the sense that the Bank increases the Bank rate when the gap between observed 
inflation and the inflation target (lagged once) is positive, but it does not reduce the Bank rate when 
the gap is negative. This behaviour suggests that the Bank is more interested in fulfilling the 
announced inflation target rather than in reducing inflation excessively. The forecasting performance 
of the model, both within and beyond the estimation period, appears to be particularly good. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1991 a constitutional reform radically modified the structure and functions of the 
Central Bank in Colombia (Banco de la República) with the aim of creating an institution 
independent from the Government’s executive branch. The new constitution stated that the main 
objective of the Bank was to control inflation, and that it had to coordinate its policies with the 
Government’s macroeconomic policies related to growth and employment. The Bank also makes 
decisions on monetary, exchange and credit policies. Since the introduction of Central Bank 
independence, the monetary policy in Colombia has followed a strategy of inflation targeting, 
with the Board of Directors of the Bank explicitly setting inflation targets, as defined by the 
annual variation in the consumer price index. The first target was announced in 1991 at a level of 
22%, and it has been gradually reduced to 4% in 2007. 
The main instrument used by the Central Bank in Colombia to implement monetary 
policy is by affecting the interest rate applied to the liquidity given to financial intermediaries. 
Changes in the interest rate of intervention (which we shall refer to as the Bank rate) are 
transmitted to the rest of the economy through a variety of channels that ultimately affect 
aggregate demand and its principal components. Thus, it is understandable that a great deal of 
expectations are formed by economic agents before the time the Board of Directors of the Bank 
meets, usually the last Friday of each month, in order to announce whether it has decided to cut, 
increase or leave the Bank rate unaltered; these changes have historically been discrete, taken on 
the values 0, ±25, ±50, ±75 and ±100 basis points.
1 
The purpose of this paper is to propose an econometric specification that attempts to 
model the discrete changes in the interest rate used by the Bank to intervene in the money market. 
                                                 
1 Another monetary instrument used by the bank is the Bank Reserve Requirement Ratio, both in average and 
marginal terms. These requirements seldom change, but when they do their effect is very important.   2
The chosen specification is known as Ordered Probit, a technique that is most frequently used in 
cross-sectional studies of ordered dependent variables, i.e. variables that are not continuous but 
take a natural ordering of alternatives (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2002). Thus, in this paper we 
postulate a dynamic ordered probit model for a dependent variable that classifies changes in the 
Bank rate into three categories, depending on whether the rate was cut by at least 25 basis points, 
not changed, or increased by at least 25 basis points. This modelling approach has been 
previously applied by Eichengreen, Watson and Grossman (1985), Davutyan and Parke (1995), 
Choi (1999), Dolado, María-Dolores and Naveira (2005) and Carstensen (2006), among others, to 
estimate interest rate-setting behaviour by several central banks (Banco de España, Bank of 
England, Banque de France, Bundesbank, European Central Bank and the U.S. Federal Reserve) 
over different time periods.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the structure of 
central banking in Colombia in recent years. Section 3 presents the results of the estimation of an 
Ordered Probit model to analyse the Central Bank’s interventions in the money market. This also 
includes an evaluation of the out-of-sample forecasting performance of the model, which 
involves holding-out sample observations that are not used for the estimation of the parameters of 
the model. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. A brief review of the structure of central banking in Colombia in recent years 
In 1991 a constitutional reform granted greater political independence to the Central Bank in 
Colombia. Indeed, the new constitution created the Board of Directors of the Central Bank, which 
consists of seven members: the Minister of Finance who presides the Board without veto power; 
five Co-Directors who are appointed by the President and serve for a minimum period of four   3
years and a maximum of twelve; and the Governor of the Bank who is elected by the Co-
Directors for a minimum period of four years and a maximum of twelve. The terms of the Co-
Directors are staggered so that no President can appoint the entire Board at any time.
2 The 
Constitution stated that the main objective of the Bank was to control inflation, and that it had to 
coordinate its policies with the general macroeconomic policies aimed at generating income and 
employment growth. The Constitution forbids the Bank from lending to non-financial private 
agents – Loans to the Government are only permitted after an unanimous vote by the Board, 
something which has not happened up to now. The Bank provides liquidity to the system using 
loans to the banks, changes in the Bank Reserve Requirement Ratio and interventions in the 
foreign exchange and bonds markets.  
On the foreign exchange policy front, from November 1991 to September 1999 the Bank 
followed a crawling band system, a form of currency band (or target zone) in which the band and 
the central parity within the band are allowed to change in frequent small increments.
3 The 
crawling band system was subsequently replaced by a policy of dirty floating, with some 
interventions, theoretically aimed at decreasing the variance of the movements of the exchange 
rate. 




                                                 
2 However, it is worth mentioning that on 27
th December 2004, the Colombian Congress, through Legislative Act 02, 
approved the presidential re-election for up to one period, starting in 2006-2010. President Uribe (whose 
administration had started in 2002) was allowed to participate in the presidential election and defeated the other 
candidates. Clearly, this opened the possibility that in 2009 all five Co-Directors would have been appointed by 
President Uribe, which could compromise the political independence of the Bank.   
3 See Williamson (1996) for an account of how the crawling band performed in Colombia during the first half of the 
nineties.   4
3. Empirical modelling exercise 
We consider a dynamic Ordered Probit model where the outcome of interest is whether at a 
particular moment in time, the Central Bank of Colombia modified the interest rate at which it is 
willing to provide liquidity to the money market. As a result, the dependent variable takes on three 
discrete values, namely –1, 0 and 1, depending on whether the Bank rate was cut by at least 25 basis 
points, not changed, or increased by at least 25 basis points.
4 The choice of variables to be 
considered in the discrete monetary policy reaction function is guided by the type of variables 
typically considered in the tradition of the so-called “Taylor rules” (see Taylor, 1993), also 
including variables that might be relevant in the context of a small open economy such as 
Colombia. Thus, we assume that the Central Bank in Colombia acts according to the function: 
  () () ( ) ( )
*
11 1 1 11 1 1 ,, , , , −− − − − − − − ∆=∆− ∆ ∆∆ − ∆ −
US
tt t t t t t t t BR f p p u e i BR i BR i ,   (1) 
where  t BR ∆  is the change in the Bank rate, ( )
*
11 −− ∆− ∆ tt p p  is the gap between observed inflation 
and the Central Bank’s inflation target,  1 t u −  is the unemployment rate,  1 t e − ∆  is the annual variation 
in the peso-U.S. dollar nominal exchange rate,  1
US
t i − ∆  is the annual variation in the foreign interest 
rate as measured by the effective federal funds rate set by the Federal Reserve, () 11 tt BR i −− −  is the 
spread between the Bank rate and the market rate, the latter being measured by the interbank 
interest rate, and  () 1 − ∆−
t BR i  is the first difference in this spread. In the terminology of Svensson 
(1999), the reaction function (1) is of an explicit type because the Bank rate depends upon lagged 
variables, as opposed to an implicit reaction function which includes unknown future values of 
                                                 
4 We also tried to estimate an ordered probit model using a dependent variable defined over a finer grid of 
alternatives, taking the values of –100, –75, –50, –25, 0, 25, 50, 75 and 100 depending on the magnitude of the Bank 
rate change (measured in basis points). The results indicate that although the estimated coefficients are qualitatively 
the same, confidence intervals of the estimated threshold parameters overlap, suggesting the need to reduce the 
number of categories.   5
the variables. It is also important to notice that having lagged independent variables does not to 
contravene the spirit of a real-time forecasting exercise, which uses only information available at the 
time the forecasts are made. 
Equation (1) assumes that the Bank reacts symmetrically to changes in ()
*
11 −− ∆− ∆ tt p p . 
However, it may well be the case that the Bank adjusts the Bank rate asymmetrically, depending on 
whether lagged inflation is above or below its target. This behaviour is of particular interest in an 
environment in which the Central Bank is more interested in fulfilling the announced inflation target 
rather than in reducing inflation excessively. To allow for the possibility of asymmetric adjustment, 
we partition the term ( )
*








−− ∆− ∆ tt pp . Thus, equation (1) 
becomes: 
  () () () ( ) ( )
**
11 111 1 11 1 1 ,, , , , ,
+−
−− −−− − −− − − ∆=∆− ∆ ∆− ∆ ∆∆ − ∆ −
US
tt t t t t t t t t t BR f p p p p u e i BR i BR i . (2) 
  Following Eichengreen et. al. (1985) and Davutyan and Parke (1995), let us consider an 
unobserved target Bank rate,
*
t BR , whose changes are governed by: 
  ( )
*2 ,0 , ε β εε σ ∆= + ∼ ttt t BR N X  (3) 
where  t X  denotes the set of explanatory variables in equation (2). Next, the observed Bank rate is 

















∆= − < −






BR BR BR BR
BR BR BR
 (4) 
  For instance, the first (third) equation in (4) indicates that the observed rate will decrease 
(increase) whenever the target rate is appreciably below (above) last month’s observed Bank rate. 
The model involves the unknown threshold parameters  1 α  and  2 α  as well as the parameter vector   6
β , all of which can be estimated by maximum likelihood. 
For the purpose of our empirical modelling exercise, we have at our disposal 85 monthly 
observations running from January 2001 to January 2008. During this sample period, the number of 
times the Bank rate was cut, not changed, or increased was 16, 55 and 14 respectively.
5 
Model 1 in Table 1 reports the maximum likelihood estimation results over the period 
January 2001 to December 2007. As can be seen, several of the estimated coefficients turn out to 
be statistically significant. For example, the finding that ( )
* +
∆− ∆ tt p p is statistically significant, but  
()
* −
∆− ∆ tt p p  is not, can be viewed as an indication that, at least during the period of estimation, the 
Central Bank has been more interested in fulfilling the announced inflation target rather than in 
achieving an inflation rate lower than the target. Neither ( ) 11 tt BR i −− −  nor  () 11 −− ∆− tt BR i  was 
found to be statistically significant in the implementation of monetary policy. Model 2 in Table 1 
reports the parsimonious version of the model, after excluding irrelevant regressors. The 
McFadden pseudo-R2 of the estimated Ordered Probit model is 0.235, while the likelihood ratio test 
statistic for the significance of the four included variables is 35.327 (p-value = 0.000), and the 
overall percentage correctly predicted within the sample period is about 69%. 
Figure 1 plots the estimated probabilities that the Central Bank would cut, not change, or 
increase the interest rate used to intervene in the money market, as a function of ()
* +
∆− ∆ tt p p  (the 
other explanatory variables are set equal to their corresponding sample averages). The figure shows 
that as the gap between observed inflation and the Central Bank’s inflation target gets larger, the 
                                                 
5 The selection of the sample period is dictated by the availability of data; in particular, the unemployment data are 
available on a monthly basis starting in January 2001. The Colombian data series have been taken from Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE) as well Banco de la República, while the U.S. effective federal funds 
rate has been taken from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED). 
 
   7
probability that the Bank would increase the intervention rate goes up, while the probability of 
leaving the intervention rate constant goes down. It is also interesting to notice that the negative sign 
on the estimated unemployment coefficient suggests that when unemployment goes up the 
probability of increasing the interest rate goes down. This finding suggests that, at least during the 
sample period, the Central Bank has been concerned not only with controlling inflation, but also 
with the potential recessionary effects of its policies. The estimated coefficients on ∆ t e  and ∆
US
t r  are 
found to be positive, which indicates that external factors are also taken into account when 
implementing monetary policy.  
Finally, we present an out-of-sample forecasting exercise in which our preferred 
specification of the Ordered Probit model, which we referred to as Model 2 in Table 1, is kept fixed 
out-of-sample, but each time a forecast is made the model is re-estimated using the observed data 
that would have been available at the time. In other words, we start off by using data up to June 2007 
to forecast July 2007, and then the sample is extended by one month, up to December 2007 to 
forecast January 2008. As can be seen from Table 2, the out-of-sample model forecasts practically 
ruled out any possibility of a cut in the Bank rate, that is  ( ) Pr 1 ∆ =− t BR  is very low. Furthermore, 
the forecasting performance of the model outside the estimation period appears to be particularly 
good, as the model correctly predicts the observed outcomes in five out of seven occasions. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have estimated a simple Ordered Probit model, in order to analyse the monetary 
policy reaction function of the Central Bank in Colombia. Our findings provide evidence of an 
asymmetric reaction function, in the sense that the Central Bank increases the Bank rate when the 
gap between observed inflation and the inflation target (lagged once) is positive, but it does not   8
reduce the Bank rate when the gap is negative. This result can be viewed as evidence that the Central 
Bank has been more interested in fulfilling the announced inflation target rather than in reducing 
inflation excessively. Other variables such as economic activity (as measured by the unemployment 
rate) as well as the evolution of external variables (as measured by variations in the peso-U.S. dollar 
nominal exchange rate and in the effective federal funds rate set by the FED) have also been taken 
into account when setting the interest rate of intervention. The forecasting performance of the model 
beyond the estimation period appears particularly good, as the model correctly predicts the observed 
outcomes in five out of seven occasions.   9
Table 1. Ordered Probit estimates of monetary policy reaction function 
Sample period 2001(m1) to 2007(m12) 
 
 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coeff. St.  error Coeff. St.  error 










−− ∆− ∆ tt pp   0.252 (1.433)
  
1 t e − ∆   0.038 (0.014) 0.039 (0.015) 
1
US
t r− ∆   1.364 (0.554) 1.415 (0.598) 
() 11 tt BR i −− −   -0.125 (0.638)   
() 11 −− ∆− tt BR i   -0.902 (0.872)   
      
Threshold  parameters:     
1 α   -6.768 1.478 -6.688 (1.401) 
2 α   -4.283 1.366 -4.192 (1.255) 
      
Observations 82 83  
LR statistic  37.007 [0.000]  35.327 [0.000] 
Pseudo-R2 0.248   0.235  
The standard errors are Huber/White standard errors. Probability 
values appear in [ ].   10
 
Table 2. One-step-ahead forecast of the probabilities of change in the Bank rate 
Month  () Pr 1 ∆= − t BR ( ) Pr 0 ∆ = t BR ( ) Pr 1 ∆ = t BR Observed change
2007(m7) 0.025  0.676  0.299  Increase 
2007(m8) 0.014  0.593  0.393  No  change 
2007(m9) 0.021  0.650  0.329  No  change 
2007(m10) 0.072  0.778  0.150  No  change 
2007(m11) 0.005  0.479  0.515  Increase 
2007(m12) 0.001  0.238  0.762  No  change 
2008(m1) 0.261  0.708  0.032  No  change 
 
   11
Figure 1. Probability of changing the Bank rate as a function of the gap between observed 











Gap between observed inflation and inflation target
(percentage points)  12
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